Bankruptcy Court Denies Recognition to Non-Debtor Releases Contained in Mexican "Concurso"

In a major decision interpreting chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, Judge Harlin Hale has denied recognition of the provisions of the “Concurso” order obtained by Vitro, SAB in Mexico which would have released the liability of its non-bankrupt U.S. subsidiaries.    The Court carefully avoided any rulings which would have cast aspersions upon the Mexican legal proceedings while finding that U.S. law would not recognize the specific provision.  In re Vitro, SAB, No. 11-33335 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 6/13/12).   The opinion can be found here.   

What Happened

Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. is a holding company formed in Mexico in 1909.   It operates its business through a network of subsidiaries.   It is the largest manufacturer of glass containers and flat glass in Mexico and its name is Latin for glass.   Vitro borrowed approximately $1.225 billion in unsecured notes which were guaranteed by virtually all of its subsidiaries.   Vitro also agreed to repay approximately $2.0 billion to its subsidiaries under circumstances which raised questions from its third party creditors.

When the global recession hit in 2008, Vitro could not pay its debts.   In November and December  2010, proceedings were filed in four different jurisdictions seeking to address the Vitro debts.

1.                  On November 17, 2010, some of Vitro’s American creditors filed involuntary petitions against fifteen of Vitro’s American subsidiaries in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.   Ultimately, four of the debtors consented to relief and an additional two debtors filed voluntary petitions.  

2.                  On December 2 and 9. 2010, Vitro’s American creditors filed suit against Vitro and 49 of its subsidiaries in state court in New York.

3.         On December 13, 2010, Vitro filed a a voluntary judicial reorganization proceeding under the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles (the “Mexican Business Reorganization Act”) in the Federal District Court for Civil and Labor Matters for the State of Nuevo León, the United States of Mexico, seeking approval of a pre-packaged, “concurso” restructuring plan.

4.                  On December 14, 2010, Vitro filed a chapter 15 proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.  

While these filings set up the multinational squabble, this was only the beginning.   In Mexico, the pre-pack was rejected based on a finding that the subsidiaries were not entitled to vote.   The initial chapter 15 petition in New York was withdrawn after this filing.   On appeal, the Mexican court reversed and allowed the subsidiaries to vote.  A new chapter 15 proceeding was filed in New York.   However, the New York chapter 15 proceeding was transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.   The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction against proceedings against the Vitro parent but not the subsidiaries.    The American creditors sought an order prohibiting the American subsidiaries from voting upon the Mexican concurso but were rebuffed. 

 The Mexican concurso was ultimately approved based upon the votes of the subsidiaries.    The concurso provided that the guarantees of the subsidiaries could not be enforced.   Thus, the subsidiaries were able to vote in favor of a plan which released their guarantees.    This set the stage for the Mexican representative of Vitro to seek an order from the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas recognizing the concursoand enforcing the order to release the subsidiaries from their guarantees.

            To summarize:

1.      Vitro borrowed over a billion dollars guaranteed by its subsidiaries.

2.      Vitro filed a pre-packaged bankruptcy plan in Mexico.

3.      Vitro’s pre-pack was approved based on the votes of its subsidiaries.

4.      The Mexican plan released the subsidiaries from liability.

5.      The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas was asked to recognize the order from the Mexican Court.

 

The Comity Question

This left the Bankruptcy Court with a difficult question:   should it enforce the Mexican concursoas a matter of comity or was there a countervailing rule under American law?   Fortunately for the court, chapter 15 provides some guidance.    Under section 1507(b), an American bankruptcy court may provide “additional assistance” to a foreign debtor, but only if five conditions are met, including that  American creditors are treated fairly and the distribution scheme is substantially the same as provided under title 11.    Additionally, section 1506 allows the Bankruptcy Court to decline to enforce the order of a foreign court if it would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.”   

Whether to recognize a foreign court order under section 1507(b) is largely a matter of comity.   While comity and comedy sound very similar they have strikingly different meanings.   According to Judge Hale:

Comity should be the Court’s primary consideration when applying § 1507(b). (citation omitted).  Comity has been defined as the “recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protections of its laws.” (citation omitted). Granting comity to judgments in foreign bankruptcy proceedings is appropriate as long as U.S. parties are provided the same fundamental protections that litigants in the United States would receive.

. . .  “The principle of comity has never meant categorical deference to foreign proceedings. It is implicit in the concept that deference should be withheld where appropriate to avoid the violation of the laws, public policies, or rights of the citizens of the United States.”  (citations omitted).  

 Opinion, pp. 7-8.

In ruling upon the parties’ contentions, the Court divided its ruling into objections it rejected, objections it sustained and issues it did not reach.

The Court rejected the argument that it should not enforce the Mexican order because of corruption in Mexico.   While the creditors’ expert presented evidence of corruption in Mexico in general, it did not connect this to the specific case.   Additionally, the objecting creditors’ expert on Mexican law testified that in forty years’ practice, he had never bribed a judge.   While the Court’s conclusion appears to be sound, as well as avoiding offense to America’s neighbor to the south, the implicit suggestion that corruption should be proved by bringing testimony from a witness who has personally participated in corruption is a bit unsettling.

The Court also dismissed a number of arguments based on fairness and compliance of Mexican law on the basis that these were issues best left to the Mexican court system.  

However, in the end, the Court concluded that American law would not allow a plan of reorganization which granted wholesale releases to non-debtor parties.    The Court stated:

Generally speaking, the policy of the United States is against discharge of claims for entities other than a debtor in an insolvency proceeding, absent extraordinary circumstances not present in this case. Such policy was expressed by Congress in Bankruptcy Code Section 524, and in numerous cases in this circuit. (citations omitted). This protection of third party claims is described both in terms of jurisdiction and also as a policy. (citations omitted).

The Fifth Circuit has largely foreclosed non-consensual non-debtor releases and permanent injunctions outside of the context of mass tort claims being channeled toward a specific pool of assets.  (citations omitted).

Opinion, p. 25.   The Court ultimately concluded that the guarantor release provision of the concursowas contrary to American law and should not be enforced.    While the Court’s conclusion may be sound, it is curious that the Court did not discuss case law out of the Northern District of Texas allowing a plan to enjoin pursuit of claims against a non-party who contributes property necessary to the success of a plan which was approved by the creditors and will pay unsecured creditors 100% of the amount of their claims.  In re Bernard Steinhard Pianos USA, Inc., 292 B.R. 109 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Seatco, Inc., 257 B.R. 469 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001).    Perhaps the Court felt that those cases were too far different from those of Vitro.   However, an acknowledgement of what would constitute “extraordinary circumstances” would have been welcome.    

The bottom line here is that comity is a good thing, but not when it means an end run around American law as applied to American creditors of an American subsidiary of a foreign company.

The Fifth Circuit has approved a direct appeal and has temporarily stayed enforcement of the decision.

                       

Gadzooks! Northern District Judge Limits Impact of Pro-Snax

Judge Harlin Hale was just written an important opinion on attorney's fees in chapter 11. In re Gadzooks, Inc., No. 04-31486 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 10/5/06). Judge Hale questions the applicability of the Fifth Circuit's Pro-Snax dicta in light of subsequent Supreme court precedent. Alternatively, he would limit the opinion to debtor's counsel in doomed cases.

A Little Background

Since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, bankruptcy has become big business. Large firms which once shunned bankruptcy as being beneath them now have large departments. As a result, issues relating to employing and compensating professionals are of keen interest to those who make their living in the bankruptcy world.

In 1998, the Fifth Circuit decided the narrow issue of whether the statutory language of 11 U.S.C. Section 330(a) allowed debtor's counsel to be compensated subsequent to appointment of a trustee. The Fifth Circuit followed the statutory language and said no. Matter of Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998). That result was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in another case. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (2004). Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court said that courts should follow statute as written.

However, Pro-Snax had a second component to it. Because the firm was going to be able to receive some compensation, the Fifth Circuit gave instructions on how that compensation should be determined. The Court stated that in order to be compensable, services must result in an "identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the estate." The Court rejected the argument that services "need only be reasonable to be compensable." This holding arguably re-wrote the statute. Section 330(a)(4)(A) states that services may not be compensable if they "were not … reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate or …necessary to the administration of the estate.” Since services "not ...reasonably likely" to benefit the estate could not be compensated, by negative implication, services which were reasonably likely to benefit the estate should be compensated even if they did not ultimately turn out to yield a benefit. It could be argued that while Pro-Snax was uniformly harsh toward debtors' counsel, it was schizophrenic when it came to statutory language; the primary holding was based on a strict reading of the statute, while the dicta edited out part of the text.

At least one court has held that, regardless of whether Pro-Snax properly read the statute, that it was still the law in the Fifth Circuit and should be followed. In re Weaver, 336 B.R. 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).

The Gadzooks Case

The recent opinion by Judge Hale addresses the situation where an Equity Security Holders Committee performed services which were objectively reasonable at the time they were performed, but did not yield a benefit to the equity holders for reasons beyond the committee's control. Gadzooks was a publicly traded company which catered to women between the ages of 14-22. At the time that it filed, equity was still in the money and the U.S. Trustee appointed an equity committee. The equity committee proposed a plan which could have paid unsecured creditors as much as 75% on their claims and would have allowed equity to buy back in. Unfortunately, the Debtor's sales tanked over the 2004 holiday season. As a result, the Debtor defaulted on its DIP financing, the proposed investment transaction was canceled and the equity committee was dissolved.

Hughes & Luce, the counsel to the equity committee, filed a fee application for approximately one million dollars. Both the creditors' committee and the liquidating trustee under the subsequently confirmed plan objected based on Pro-Snax. The case set up a perfect opportunity to examine the apparent conflict between Pro-Snax and Section 330(a). First, all parties stipulated that the services were reasonably calculated to provide a benefit up through the point that the Debtor's performance crashed. Second, the failure to achieve results was a result of factors the committee could not control. Third, the party making the request was not the debtor.

The Ruling

After a lengthy analysis, Judge Hale allowed compensation up until the point of futility for two independent reasons. First, Judge Hale applied the traditional lodestar analysis used by the Fifth Circuit prior to Pro-Snax to determine how much compensation was allowable. This conclusion was based on the preceeding analysis which rejected hindsight as a basis for denying fees. Judge Hale quoted the following language from the Supreme Court's Lamie opinion: "It is well established that 'when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts--at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd--is to enforce it according to its terms." Judge Hale added his own conclusion that, "This Court finds that, based on the wording in Section 330(a)(3) and (4), professional fees are not to be judged in hindsight."

Judge Hale relied on the intervening Supreme Court decision overturn the inconsistency in Pro-Snax.The Supreme Court said to follow the text of Section 330(a). The Pro-Snax dicta strayed from the text. Thus, while the Supreme Court upheld the holding in Pro-Snax, it implicitly rejected the dicta.

Judge Hale acknowledged that his ruling might be a little bold. He stated, "This Court realizes that its understanding of Pro-Snax may be misplaced. Certainly, other courts in Texas have constured the decision as requiring a hindsight analysis for professionals." Consequently, he offered a second rationale, finding that "Nevertheless, the Pro-Snax opinion is directed at a debtor's professionals, for obvious reasons--usually they have far more control over the reorganization efforts and strategy in a bankruptcy case. At least in Pro-Snax, they controlled the conversion to chapter 11 and the failed plan process." In his concluding paragraph, Judge Hale characterized Pro-Snax as "directed to professionals for the debtor who knew that their efforts were futile."

Judge Hale's order (which preceded the opinion) has already been appealed. Therefore it is likely that the Fifth Circuit will have the opportunity to revisit Pro-Snax in light of a decision squarely on point. If Gadzooks holds up, it will mean that professionals in bankruptcy will be less likely to have their fees denied based on factors beyond their control, such as poor holiday shopping sales. Of course, Gadzooks can't fix the largest problem in professional compensation--estates with no cash to pay professionals. However, it does remove an artificial roadblock.

Update:

On appeal, U.S. District Judge Jane Boyle reversed the Bankruptcy Court's opinion in Gadzooks. William Kaye vs. Hughes & Luce, LLP, No. 3:06-CV-01863-B (N.D. Tex. 7/13/07). Judge Boyle found that although the Fifth Circuit's Pro-Snax discussion of the correct standard to apply in awarding attorney's fees under Sec. 330 was dicta, that it was judicial dicta rather than obiter dicta. Judical dicta is defined as an opinion on an issue which was directly briefed and argued by the parties, but which was not essential to the decision. Judge Boyle found that judicial dicta should not be lightly disregarded. The Court also questioned whether the Circuit's instructions on the test to be applied on remand was really dicta at all.

The District Court engaged in a curious discussion of whether Pro-Snax was inconsistent with the language of Sec. 330. On the one hand, the District Court noted that it was bound to apply Pro-Snax regardless of whether it was correct and that many courts had disagreed with its logic. On the other hand, the District Court found that Sec. 330 could possibly be construed consistently with Pro-Snax.

Finally, the District Court rejected the Bankruptcy Court's attempt to limit Pro-Snax to its original context of awarding fees to debtor's counsel. The District Court found that the language of Sec. 330 did not distinguish between different types of professionals.

The District Court ruling has been appealed to the Fifth Circuit.