Pilgrim's Pride Opinion Allows Enhancements in Bankruptcy, Offers Comprehensive Overview of Bankruptcy Fees

The Fifth Circuit has affirmed a $1 million fee enhancement to a chief restructuring officer who achieved results described as “rare and exceptional.”  Matter of Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 11-10774 (5^th Cir. 8/10/12).   The opinion can be found here.   The Court rejected the argument that a recent Supreme Court opinion on fee shifting precluded enhancements and, in the process, set forth a comprehensive framework for allowance of professional fees in bankruptcy.   Curiously, the opinion did not mention the Court’s opinion in Matter of Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F.3d 414 (5^th Cir. 1998).

What Happened

When Pilgrim’s Pride Company filed for chapter 11 relief in December 2008, its prospects did not look good.   It had lost about $1 billion the previous fiscal year and was incurring negative cash flow of $300 million a year.   The Debtors anticipated that unsecured creditors would receive, at best, a debt for equity swap, and that equity would be cancelled. 

  

CRG Partners, LLC was engaged as chief restructuring officer.    Just over a year later, the company confirmed a plan which paid all secured and unsecured creditors in full and distributed equity interests valued at $450 million to the pre-petition shareholders.   

After the plan was confirmed, CRG requested that it be allowed compensation of $5.98 million plus an enhancement of $1 million.    The Debtor’s Board of Directors supported the enhancement.   The U.S. Trustee objected to the enhancement on the basis that CRG had already been adequately compensated through its lodestar-calculated fee.   The Bankruptcy Court denied the request for enhancement based on Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010).   The District Court reversed, finding that Perdue was not binding in the bankruptcy context.

On remand, the Bankruptcy Court approved the enhancement and the U.S. Trustee appealed.    The UST argued that Perdue precluded the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit rejected the Trustee’s position and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court order approving the additional award.

An Overview of Professional Fees

In reaching its conclusion that enhancements remained viable, the Court of Appeals provided an extensive discussion of the history of awards of professional fees in the Fifth Circuit.   Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts in the Fifth Circuit applied the twelve Johnson factors, which included such requirements as the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions, skill required, undesirability of the case and reputation of the attorneys.    In re First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291, 1298-99 (5^th Cir. 1977), quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5^th Cir. 1974).   (Attorneys of a certain level of experience will remember preparing fee applications reciting the twelve Johnson/First Colonial factors even though many of them were usually irrelevant to the specific case).   While Johnson was a civil rights case, the First Colonial court found the factors to be “equally useful whenever the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is authorized by statute.”     Id. at 1299.   While the same factors might be applicable, bankruptcy courts were advised to make awards at the lower end of the spectrum in light of the “strong policy of the Bankruptcy Act that estates be administered as efficiently as possible.”    Id.

The lodestar method was recommended by another Act case, In re Lawler, 807 F.2d 1207 (5^th Cir. 1987).    Under the lodestar method, the Court determines a reasonable number of hours multiplied by a reasonable rate and then adjusts the resulting fee up or down based upon the other Johnsonfactors.

When section 330(a) was adopted as part of the Bankruptcy Code, it retained the overall framework of compensation under the Act, but rejected the “economy of the estate” limitation.   This meant that bankruptcy lawyers could be compensated at the same rate as other skilled professionals.   

Section 330(a) was amended in 1994 to include a list of six non-exclusive factors to be considered in awarding compensation and two instances in which the court should deny compensation.    Notwithstanding the statutory definition, the Fifth Circuit found that the prior case law and the statutory provisions provided a complimentary framework.

Following the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment, we made clear that the lodestar, Johnson factors, and §330 coalesced to form the framework that regulates the compensation of professionals employed by the bankruptcy estate.   (citation omitted).   Under this framework, bankruptcy courts must first calculate the amount of the lodestar.   (citation omitted).    After doing so, the courts “then may adjust the lodestar up or down based on the factors contained in §330 and [their] consideration of the factors listed in Johnson.”   (citation omitted).    We have also emphasized that bankruptcy courts have “considerable discretion” when determining whether an upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar is warranted.

Opinion, at p. 8.   

The Court also conducted an historical analysis of fee enhancements in bankruptcy, finding that, although they were extraordinary, they had been allowed under both the Bankruptcy Act and the Code.    The Court noted that 

(I)f enhancements were possible when fees were awarded “at the lower end of the spectrum of reasonableness,” then they surely remained possible after that ceiling was removed and the statutory text was otherwise unchanged.

Opinion, at p. 13.    The Court’s point is that because the Bankruptcy Act allowed enhancements despite the focus on economy of administration that it would be reasonable for enhancements to be allowed under the more liberal provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

In conclusion, the Court ruled that enhancements were a part of the process of upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar and remained available in extraordinary situations.

In sum, we have consistently held that bankruptcy courts have broad discretion to adjust the lodestar upwards or downwards when awarding reasonable compensation to professionals employed by the estate pursuant to § 330(a). However, this discretion is far from limitless. Upward adjustments, for instance, are still only permissible in rare and exceptional circumstances--such as in Rose Pass Mines and Lawler, where the applicants had provided superior services that produced outstanding results--that are supported by detailed findings from the bankruptcy court and specific evidence in the record.

Opinion, at 15.

Sub Silentio and the Rule of Orderliness 

Having concluded that enhancements remained viable, the Court turned its attention to whether the Supreme Court had “unequivocally, sub silentio overruled our circuit’s bankruptcy precedent.”   Opinion, p. 15.  

 

In Perdue, the Supreme Court rejected a request for an enhancement in a civil rights case.   In interpreting the term “reasonable fees” under 42 U.S.C. §1988, the Supreme Court noted that the courts had initially applied the twelve Johnsonfactors, but had transitioned to a lodestar approach in order to “cabin() the discretion of trial judges.”    The Supreme Court concluded that enhancements could be allowed under section 1988, but only where the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation did not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value, where the litigation involved an “extraordinary” outlay of expenses and where there was an “exceptional delay” in payment, especially where that delay was due to the defense.    The Court also noted that in civil rights cases, the presumption should be against an enhancement because defendants would be less likely to settle if faced with an open-ended fee request and because civil rights judgments were often paid by the public rather than the defendant. 

  

The Fifth Circuit found that Perdue did not apply in the bankruptcy context.   Relying on the rule of orderliness, as recently articulated in Technical Automation Services Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp., 673 F.3d 399 (5^th Cir. 2012)(which held that Stern v. Marshall did not implicate the authority of Magistrate Judges), the Fifth Circuit found that Perdue was not directly on point and therefore did not compel the Court to abandon its prior precedent.   Among other things, the Court found that bankruptcy fee requests did not entail the same settlement considerations as civil rights cases and that the bankruptcy estate rather than the taxpayer would be paying the fees. 

 

The Court also noted that while the term “reasonable fees” in section 1988 offered little guidance to courts, that section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contained detailed criteria for awarding fees.   

As a result, the Court concluded that until rescinded by a higher authority, fee enhancements were still possible in bankruptcy.   As a result, the Court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s enhanced fee award to CRG Partners.

What It Means

In the particular case, Pilgrim’s Pride means that a particular professional was recognized for doing an extraordinary job.    In the larger context, Pilgrim’s Pride is significant for what its historical analysis said for what it left unsaid.    

From an historical perspective, Pilgrim’s Prideevidences the development of bankruptcy law as its own discipline.    As of 1977, both bankruptcy law and civil rights law followed the twelve Johnsonfactors.   In the intervening 35 years, bankruptcy has developed its own body of fee jurisprudence.    While both bankruptcy law and civil rights law moved from the Johnson factors to a primarily lodestar based approach, Congress saw fit to define bankruptcy standards in more detail.     The Pilgrim’s Pride decision recognizes that bankruptcy fees fulfill a different role than fees in civil rights cases.    While the Court did not fully articulate it, I believe the difference is this.   Bankruptcy is inherently a collective process in which scarce resources are marshaled for the benefit of the creditor body and (in some cases) equity.    Allowing enhanced fees in rare cases provides incentives for professionals to take on difficult cases and be recognized when they deliver superior results.   Civil rights cases, on the other hand, are focused on compensating a harm and are a zero sum proposition.   Every dollar paid to the plaintiffs and their attorneys is a dollar taken away from the defendants and, by extension, the taxpayers.    While civil rights actions should incentivize government actors to obey the law in future cases, this function is secondary to compensating the wronged individual.    In a bankruptcy case, the professional may not only allocate scarce resources according to an ordered scheme of priorities, but may actually increase the pool of resources.   In a civil rights case, it seems that counsel is focused on obtaining an equitable transfer of resources from one party to another.    

Pilgrim’s Pride also curious because it does not mention the requirement that a professional demonstrate an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the bankruptcy estate” as required by In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc. in order to be compensated.   There is a tension between Pro-Snax and section 330(a)(4)(A)(i)(I) which mandates denial of fees for services not “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate.”   There is a significant difference in requiring that services be “reasonably likely” to benefit the estate as opposed to actually yielding an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit.”    In the one instance, compensation is based on whether the services appeared to be reasonable at the time, while the other makes compensation contingent on results.    Pilgrim’s Pride discusses the Johnson factors, the lodestar test and the statutory provisions of section 330(a), but does not discuss Pro-Snax.  Judge Carl Stewart, who authored Pro-Snax, was on the panel that decided Pilgrim’s Pride.

It is certainly possible that the panel did not see the need to discuss Pro-Snax for the reason that Pilgrim’s Pride was a case involving not just an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit,” but an extraordinary one at that.    However, given the Court’s comprehensive discussion of the framework for fees in bankruptcy and its contrast with fees in civil rights cases, the actual results requirement would seem to be a reasonable thing to mention.   

My personal opinion (which is partially motivated by self-interest) is that the Pro-Snax panel never intended to impose an actual results requirement.    The Pilgrim’s Pride opinion discusses how “the lodestar, Johnson factors, and §330 coalesced to form the framework that regulates the compensation of professionals employed by the bankruptcy estate.”    Under Johnson, results were one of twelve factors to be considered.   Under section 330(a), the court is instructed to examine whether the services were “beneficial at the time” and whether they were “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate.”   The lodestar may be adjusted upwards or downwards based upon the results.    Given that results are a factor to be considered under each of these approaches, it is much more reasonable to conclude that the Pro-Snax panel meant to emphasize the importance of results but not to make them an absolute requirement.   At the very least, it will make for an interesting argument when the Court is asked directly to reconcile Pilgrim’s Pride, Pro-Snax and the language of section 330(a).

Disclosure:   I have a case pending on appeal that raises the application of Pro-Snax.

New Opinion Makes Sense of "Identifiable, Tangible and Material Benefit" Language From Pro-Snax

In Matter of Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F.3d 414 (5^th Cir. 1998), a panel of the Fifth Circuit made the uncontroversial ruling that a chapter 11 debtor’s attorney could not recover attorney’s fees from the bankruptcy estate after appointment of a trustee.   However, the court went one step further and stated that in order to recover fees for the period prior to appointment of the trustee, the applicant must demonstrate an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the estate” in order to be compensated.   Most courts to consider this standard have concluded that when a case does not generate results notwithstanding the best professional efforts of the attorney that compensation may not be allowed except for certain mandatory services.   That consensus was broken when Judge Michael Lynn ruled that an “identifiable, tangible and material result to the estate” means that an attorney acted at the behest of his client acting in the exercise of its business judgment.   In re Broughton Ltd. Partnership, No. 10-42327 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 4/25/12), a copy of which can be found here.   Judge Lynn’s ruling transforms the standard for compensation from a one-sided contingency fee to a professional judgment standard and is consistent with the text of 11 U.S.C. §330.    (Disclosure:  I am currently appealing a Pro-Snax ruling and will be relying upon the Broughton Ltd. Partnership case.).

What Happened

The facts are straightforward.  The debtors’ business was “the development of high-end residential subdivisions and sales of the developed lots.”  Special counsel was retained to negotiate the sale of 22 lots to a specific purchaser.     The purchaser required that a homeowners association waive certain rights.   When the homeowners association refused, the contract fell through notwithstanding counsel's efforts.  When     the sale fell through, the case ultimately converted.    When special counsel applied for its fees, the U.S. Trustee objected based upon Pro-Snax.  

The Ruling

 The Court noted that bankruptcy courts within the Fifth Circuit following Pro-Snax had required that fees be reasonable on both a prospective basis and based on a retrospective review.    The prospective test is based on section 330(a)(3)(C)  which provides that “the services (be) necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, [the bankruptcy case].”   The retrospective or hindsight test incorporates the Pro-Snax requirement that the services actually result in an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the estate.”

Prospective Test

The U.S. Trustee argued that it was not even necessary to apply the retrospective test since the attorney should have realized early on that the proposed transaction would not result in a benefit to the estate.   The Court disagreed, noting that “(t)he proposed sale to SPOT was viewed in late 2010, not only by the court, but by the various parties, as the keystone of Debtors’ potential reorganization.”   Opinion, p. 5.   The Court went on to state that: 

That the transaction was a difficult one to put together and that the idiosyncrasies of the parties might frustrate the efforts of counsel does not mean that counsel was required to cease work and give up. Rather, so long as a professional is doing its principal’s bidding and there is a reasonable prospect of success, the professional is entitled to work in the expectation of being paid.

 Opinion, p. 6.   It is nice to see that the Court did not adopt the position that when the going gets tough, those who want to get paid give up.   

Retrospective Test

The Court approached the question of what constituted an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the estate” from several angles.  First, the Court noted that a literal application of the phrase could result in absurd results. 

The problem posed by Pro-Snax is that use of the word “benefit” suggests a positive contribution is required. An “identifiable, tangible, and material” benefit to the estate at first blush would appear to be something that augments the estate. Yet it seems clear that professionals serving a debtor or other fiduciary in a chapter 11 case cannot be limited in their compensation to those activities that actually add to the estate. First, such a determination would exclude from compensation many critical functions performed by professionals in the course of a chapter 11 case. Administrative matters, operational oversight, disputes respecting control, steps in the plan process such as extensions of exclusivity and many other matters dealt with by professionals covered by Pro-Snax do not increase the debtor’s estate or reduce the claims against it – yet the chapter 11 case could not work if professionals did not perform services in connection with these functions.

 

Second, as with the Firm’s work, that work which a professional undertakes doesn’t always lead to success.16 Deals – as with SPOT – fall through. Litigation on behalf of the estate may offer the prospect of substantial recoveries, but will not necessarily be won. It may be that counsel representing Stern, the estate representative in Stern v. Marshall, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), was unsuccessful, ultimately losing the estate’s case in the United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision. It is unthinkable that that counsel’s work leading to that result should be uncompensated.   The very fact that section 328(b) permits (but does not require) retention of professionals on, inter alia, a contingency basis demonstrates that Congress did not intend all professional services to be compensable only on that basis. Yet, as some courts have noted, to apply Pro-Snax as requiring estate augmentation would be tantamount to doing so. 

Opinion, pp. 10-11.

 Digging deeper, the Court looked at the Pro-Snax case itself.   The only clue that the Fifth Circuit gave as to the meaning of “identifiable, tangible and material” was a citation to In re Melp, Ltd., 179 B.R. 636 (E.D. Mo. 1995).   That case in turn referred to: 

In undertaking a “benefit analysis,” a court should consider: (1) whether the debtor’s attorney’s actions duplicated the duties of the trustee or the trustee’s counsel under 11 U.S.C. § 1106; (2) whether the services have in fact, obstructed or impeded the administration of the estate; and (3) whether the debtor’s attorney’s actions are consistent with the debtor’s duties under 11 U.S.C. § 521.

 In re Melp, 179 B.R. at 640.    Since the Fifth Circuit relied on Melp in formulating its test, it is only reasonable to see what the Melp Court meant.

Judge Lynn also examined the construction given to “identifiable, tangle and material benefit” by District Judge Jane Boyle in Kaye v. Hughes & Luce, LLP, (In re Gadzooks, Inc.), 2007 WL 2059724, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Jul.13, 2007).   I have previously written about the Gadzookscase here, here and here. 

The Gadzooks court, which applied the benefit test to counsel representing an equity committee, struggled with how to reconcile the Pro-Snax requirement of an “identifiable, tangible, and material benefit” to the estate, including its suggestion of a retrospective review of counsel’s work, with section 330(a)(3)(C) which indicate a professional’s efforts should be assessed prospectively, as of the time they were to be performed. Judge Boyle, in Gadzooks, concluded that the requirement set by the Court of Appeals of a benefit to the estate constituted a gloss on the provision in section 330(a)(1)(A) that counsel be awarded “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the…professional person.” See In re Gadzooks¸ 2007 WL 2059724, at *9. That is, services will benefit the estate if they are actual and necessary. 

Opinion, pp. 14-15.    

The Court also looked to how similar language in section 503(b)(1) has been interpreted. 

As it happens, the term “actual, necessary” is found not only in section 330(a)(1)(A) but as well in section 503(b)(1)(A), where it modifies the words “costs and expenses of preserving the estate” and limits what costs and expenses are entitled to priority payment as administrative claims. As used in section 503(b)(1)(A), “actual, necessary” clearly does not mean administrative expenses are limited to only those that enhance or at least preserve a debtor’s estate. It has been black letter law since the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 478, 88 S.Ct. 1759, 20 L.Ed.2d 751 (1968), that torts committed by an estate representative in the course of performing his, her or its duties give rise to claims entitled to administrative priority. This is because, as the Court reasoned in Reading, a bankruptcy estate, just like any other participant in the business world, must pay those costs necessarily incident to its operations, including satisfying claims arising from torts attributable to the estate.

 

Similar reasoning can be applied to the efforts of the professionals of a debtor in possession (or other statutory bankruptcy fiduciary). It is the duty of a debtor in possession –like any estate representative – to realize any possible value from assets of the estate. If it eventually proves true that an asset cannot be realized upon, that does not mean it should not be investigated and its liquidation (or other means of realization) pursued, so long as, as the Pro-Snax court observed, “the chances of success…outweigh the costs of pursuing the action.” 157 F.3d at 426. Thus, for example, in Stern v. Marshall, pursuit of Stern’s counterclaim was appropriate and compensable, since the chances of success were good. That the case ultimately was lost 5-4 in the Supreme Court (on the basis of the bankruptcy court’s constitutional inability to enter a final judgment on Stern’s counterclaim) does not change the fact that the estate representative and estate professionals were doing their duty in pursuing it. 

Opinion, pp. 15-16.

The Conclusion

Having considered all of these factors, the Court reached its ultimate conclusion that a professional confers an identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the estate when it performs services at the direction of the representative of the estate which is acting within its business judgment. 

The court today holds that a professional provides an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit” to a bankruptcy estate within the meaning of Pro-Snax through assisting the estate representative in administering an asset of the estate, whether or not the effect of administration of the asset is enhancement of the estate, so long as the professional’s services are performed at the direction of the estate representative and the estate representative is acting in accordance with the Code and its sound business judgment.  In doing so, the court focuses on the nature of the benefit provided but also takes account of public policy and an estate representative’s decision making authority in bankruptcy.

 

With regard to the latter, the court relies on an estate representative’s sound business judgment in approving acts outside the ordinary course of business.  (citation omtted).Unless the manner in which an estate representative arrives at a decision is seriously flawed, the court will defer to the estate representative.  (citation omitted). A professional should similarly be able to rely on its client’s business judgment in acting in accordance with the client’s instructions.

 

As to public policy, professionals are retained by an estate representative to advise and assist the representative in carrying out his, her or its duties under the Code. To burden professionals by making their compensation contingent upon the result of the estate representative’s decisions must necessarily skew the regime intended in the Code and will surely create conflicts where a professional believes its client’s decision, though arrived at through due diligence, is not the right one. Had Congress wished professionals retained under section 327 of the Code to second-guess and perhaps veto decisions of a trustee or debtor in possession, it surely would have said so. 

Opinion, pp. 17-18.

What It Means

While I acknowledge my own bias, I think that Broughton Ltd. Partnership should change the way that Courts in the Fifth Circuit interpret Pro-Snax.     Judge Lynn’s interpretation allows courts to follow the language used in Pro-Snax without doing violence to the language or the logic of the Code.

Unlocking the Code    

Section 330(a) contains several criteria for allowing compensation in bankruptcy, but does not use the words identifiable, tangible and material benefit.   In fact, it expressly adopts a prospective analysis.

The statute reads:

§ 330.  Compensation of officers

(a) (1) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a trustee, a consumer privacy ombudsman appointed under section 332, an examiner, an ombudsman appointed under section 333, or a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103--      (A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner, ombudsman, professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and      (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.

***

      (3) In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to an examiner, trustee under chapter 11, or professional person, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including--      (A) the time spent on such services;      (B) the rates charged for such services;      (C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title;      (D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed;      (E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and      (F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.   (4) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow compensation for--         (i) unnecessary duplication of services; or         (ii) services that were not--            (I) reasonably likely to benefitthe debtor's estate; or            (II) necessary to the administration of the case.

***

     (6) Any compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application shall be based on the level and skill reasonably required to prepare the application.  

***

 (emphasis added).

Interpreting Pro-Snax to require a positive result in order to get paid would be to eliminate the words “at the time at which the services were rendered” and “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate” from section 330(a).  Such a view (even though it has been the prevailing one) effectively accuses the panel of negligence at best or judicial activism at worst.   

This tension was acknowledged by Judge Frank Monroe in In re Weaver, 336 B.R. 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005), when he stated: 

Applicant Borsheim argues that Pro-Snax is at odds with the statute and misinterprets it since the statute plainly authorizes fees "for actual, necessary services"-as well as services that are "reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate".    Even if such be true, this Court is constrained to follow the 5th Circuit's interpretation. 

Weaver, at 119. 

Judge Lynn, by following Judge Boyle’s conclusion that “identifiable, tangible and material benefit” was merely a gloss upon “actual, necessary services,” has tethered Pro-Snax to the language of the Code and has consistently followed the underlying authority relied upon by the Pro-Snax panel.

 

With all respect to Judge Monroe (who was a venerable and well-respected judge), it is far better to follow the Fifth Circuit and follow the language of the Code at the same time.   Judge Lynn has succeeded in doing both.

(In fairness to Judge Monroe, he had a subsequent opinion in In re Spillman Development Group, Ltd., 376 B.R. 543 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007),  in which he which took a more nuanced approach to Pro-Snax.) 

When the Going Gets Tough

The Broughton Ltd. Partnership opinion is also good for the system.    The English common law system adopted in the United States relies upon an adversarial system in which opposing parties are represented by zealous advocates.    Bankruptcy is a multi-party process.   If the most aggressive creditor can threaten debtor's counsel with not getting paid, debtor's counsel will have an incentive to placate that party at the expense of everyone else.   Moreover, if the court increases the risk of not getting paid, then either lawyers will demand higher fees to compensate for that risk or will forego those representations altogether, leaving them to less qualified lawyers.    In order for the system to work, good lawyers need to have a reasonable opportunity to be compensated without being a guarantor of the success of their client's case.  While some debtors may be less than deserving scoundrels who use bankruptcy to escape payment of their just debts, the opposite is also true.   Some creditors are more interested in using their position to prevent debtors from paying their debts, either so that they can foreclose and reap a windfall or simply to crush another party out of malice and spite.    While the bankruptcy court cannot grant equal resources to all parties, it can at least avoid penalizing one side.